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Abstract 
 Voting is one of the ways shareholders have to exercise governance. Using 19 
countries, through a period of five years, we examine whether institutional investors 
promote better governance. We analyze if their presence in companies is linked with higher 
levels of shareholder activism, through voting. We find that companies with more 
institutional investors are subject to more votes “against” at Annual General Meetings, 
therefore implying that institutions promote better governance practices. Moreover, we find 
that foreign investors are the ones who drive higher levels of activism. Around the world, 
companies located in countries with less shareholder protective legal frameworks are the 
ones subject to higher scrutiny from shareholders. 
 Keywords: Corporate Governance; Voting; Shareholder Activism; Institutional 
Investors. 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 The author would like to thank Professor Miguel Ferreira for all his guidance 
throughout the development of this project, Professor Pedro Matos for his insights, 
Professors Iliyan Georgiev and João Amaro de Matos for the comments on the intermediate 
version, Simão Arouca for all his assistance and all members of Nova SBE’s office 129 for 
the support provided through the past few months.  
 The author is also deeply appreciated for the unconditional help of his family. 
3 
 
1. Introduction 
Shareholders have two ways to try to influence corporate governance. They can be active using their 
“voice” by entering private talks with the management or by voting against the proposals made by them; or they 
can take a passive role and exercise governance by “voting with their feet”, which means selling the shares they 
hold in the company. 
 In this paper we study whether institutional shareholders actually use their option to vote against the 
proposals made by the management as a way to exercise governance by comparing the total levels of dissent – the 
form of voting associated with activism of shareholders – in companies with different levels of institutional 
ownership. Also, we look at what type of proposals institutional investors vote “against” more often. We want to 
know to which extent these investors take on a more active role in influencing corporate governance in the 
companies in which they invest, compared to other investors. 
 Nowadays it is extremely easy to become a shareholder of a company, regardless of its location. 
However, it may not be as simple to contribute to the governance of a company which is on the other side of the 
world. Stulz (2005) argues that there are limits to globalization since rulers of sovereign states, corporate insiders or 
controlling shareholders pursue their own interests at the expense of other outside investors. As institutions invest 
other people’s money, it is of the utmost importance that they can somehow influence the companies they invest in, 
and try to steer them in a good direction. In this paper we asses if institutional shareholders do so through their 
“voice”, voting in the Annual General Meetings, in the best interest of their investors. 
By taking all disclosed voting outcomes in Europe, Canada and Australia, between 2008 and 2012, we 
find that dissent is generally positively correlated with the presence of institutional investors. Most importantly, such 
relation assumes a stronger role for topics related to compensation and capitalization. We also find that this relation 
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happens primordially on countries with weaker investor protection laws, which signals that institutional investors 
are voting to exercise governance in order to compensate for the lack of investor protection. 
 Additionally, we test what type of institutional shareholders contribute to the improvement of companies’ 
corporate governance through voting, by splitting them according to their “colors” as Ferreira and Matos (2008). 
We find that active (or independent) investors, as well as foreign investors, tend to be the drivers of the relation 
between institutional ownership and dissent, as opposed to passive (or grey) and domestic investors. 
 Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira and Matos (2011) have shown that companies with a higher percentage of 
institutional ownership, especially if foreign, tend to have better governance (measured by Gov41
1
). Also, this 
happens more frequently in countries with civil law legal structures, as opposed to the more investor protective 
common law countries. 
Furthermore Iliev, Lins, Miller and Roth (2012) have already shown that U.S. institutional investors use 
voting as a way to exercise governance in the companies they invest in outside their home country, and that firm 
and country-level investor protection laws, as well as measures of firm-level managerial entrenchment, influence 
the way these shareholders vote on director-related proposals. 
 Finally, Morgan, Poulsen and Wolf (2006) find that, for compensation proposals in companies in the 
S&P 500 between 1992 and 2003, shareholders in general have changed their way of voting with time by 
becoming more and more aggressive, especially for proposals or companies where the dilution caused by such 
proposals can be harmful to them. This evolution has made dissent levels grow to an extent where some proposals 
have started being rejected in the years. 
 Given all of this, we expect to find institutional investors using their power to exercise governance through 
voting, in particular for proposals related to compensation, or in companies located in countries with weak investor 
                                                          
1
 Gov41 is an index calculated by Aggarwal et al. (2010) using 41 firm-level governance attributes from 
RiskMetriks. 
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protection laws. However, to this date, we have not yet found a study linking the institutional ownership of a firm to 
the overall voting outcomes as a measure of governance. 
2. Data & Variables 
2.1.  Voting Data 
The voting data used in this study was obtained from RiskMetrics and contains the voting outcomes of all 
shareholder meetings across Europe
2
, Australia, and Canada between 2008 and 2012. 
In these databases the information provided encompasses the names and tickers of the firms, the date of 
the shareholder meetings, the description of the topics in the agenda, and the voting outcome. For each proposal, we 
calculate dissent as the total number of votes that do not follow the management recommendation. With this in 
mind, whenever the management recommends voting “For” the dissent is represented by the total votes “Against” 
and “Abstain”. 
In this study, we analyze both the total dissent, which includes management and shareholder proposals, 
and specific dissent on the proposals made by the management. Shareholder proposals are not individually 
analyzed because of the frequent absence of data regarding management recommendation (making it impossible 
to calculate dissent), as well as the diversity of topics covered within this category. For those countries or years
3
 
where no information regarding the management recommendation for each proposal exists, dissent is only 
calculated for management proposals, assuming the inherent recommendation to be always “For”. 
                                                          
2
 European countries considered: Austria (ATX 20); Belgium (BEL20); Denmark (OMXC 20); Finland 
(OMX-H 25); France (SBF 120); Germany (Dax 30 and MDAX 50); Greece (ASE 20); Ireland (ISEQ 
General); Italy (FTSE MIB and MIDCAP); Luxembourg (LuxX); The Netherlands (AEX 25 and AMX 25); 
Norway (OBXS 30); Portugal (PSI 20); Spain (IBEX35); Sweden (OMXS 20); United Kingdom (FTSE 350). 
3
 In the database for Europe (2008) and Australia there is no data on the management recommendation. 
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We sort all management proposals according to the following categories: (1) Routine / Business, (2) 
Director Related, (3) Compensation, (4) Preferred / Bondholders, (5) Capitalization, (6) Anti-takeover related, (7) 
Reorganization and Mergers, and (8) Social Proposals.  
Table 1 reports the number of observations, firms, average total dissent, and average dissent for each 
category (only for management proposals) per country. Table 2 reports the same data per country/year. In a 
universe of 2006 companies throughout five years, corresponding to 5,878 different observations, the average total 
dissent is 4.85%.  
Later on, we divide the data according to the legal origin of the companies’ home countries, to better 
understand how differently investors act in face of either common or civil
4
 law regimes. Herein, we expect to see 
investors taking a more active role in civil law countries, as these have weaker investor protection laws, as observed 
by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). 
2.2.  Explanatory Variables 
All time variable explanatory variables are lagged one period, being measured at the end of the fiscal year 
before the shareholder meeting in which dissent is measured, in order to mitigate any potential endogeneity. 
In our regressions, we will test if the total institutional ownership level of a company has any real effect on 
the dissent levels of that company. We expect this impact to be positive because, according to Iliev et al. (2012), 
institutional investors use voting as a tool to exercise governance. Nonetheless, there are some caveats when 
making such an interpretation. On the one hand, non-institutional investors may vote “against” less often (meaning 
less dissent) if they see that institutions have a significant stake in the company and believe they will be exercising 
governance for all shareholders (this hypothesis is not considered by Iliev et al. (2012) as they only look at the votes 
                                                          
4
 For the purpose of the study we name as “Civil” all countries with Civil Law or French/Socialist legal 
origins. 
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cast by U.S. institutional investors). On the other, the possibility of institutional investors “voting with their feet” 
makes it harder to predict the impact of total institutional ownership on dissent. 
Additionally, following Ferreira and Matos (2008), total institutional ownership of a firm is segmented 
according to its “colors”, as previously mentioned.  Depending on their country of origin, we split the investors into 
domestic and foreign and according to their institution’s nature we divide investors into passive and active. 
 We expect that foreign investors will make more use of dissent as a governance tool when compared to 
domestic investors because, as seen by Aggarwal et al. (2011), there is a positive relation between foreign 
institutional ownership and governance. Also, Ferreira and Matos (2008) find that higher levels of foreign 
institutional ownership are related to firm value and performance. However, there is yet no study that relates these 
institutional ownership variables and dissent.  
As for the nature of the institutional investors (where active ones are mutual fund managers or investment 
advisers and the passive correspond to institutions like bank trusts, insurance companies, or pension funds), we 
believe that companies will face dissent more frequently the higher the levels of active institutional ownership they 
have, and less dissent for higher levels of passive institutional ownership. Once more, Aggarwal et al. (2011) find 
that companies with higher levels of active institutional ownership score higher in the governance index Gov41. 
However, even though we expect active investors to be willing to collect more information about their investments 
and face less regulatory restrictions (in opposition to passive investors who tend to face higher monitoring costs, and 
are more prone to create business relationships with their invested firms) we have not yet seen any study relating 
these natures of institutional ownership and dissent. 
Following Iliev et al. (2012), we use some variables that measure the level of managerial entrenchment of 
a firm. Particularly, we look at insider control, a measure of the percentage of closely held shares obtained from 
Worldscope. In their studies, Iliev et al. (2012) and Cai et al. (2009) find that the greater the percentage of closely 
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held shares, the higher the dissent levels are. Although apparently contradictory, such a result does not go against 
our expectation of a negative relation given the differences in the dependent variable under analysis. Whereas those 
authors focus only on dissent by American investors in foreign countries, we look at total dissent. This means that a 
stronger entrenchment is expected to originate fewer votes “against”, as insiders are not expected to vote “against”. 
Therefore, we expect dissent to be lower, for higher values of insider control.  
Furthermore, Gov41 a measure for the quality of the corporate governance inside a firm previously used in 
Aggarwal et al. (2011) and Iliev et al. (2012), is also used. Companies with better governance practices have this 
index closer to 1 than to 0 and are expected to face less dissent. According to Iliev et al. (2012), companies with 
higher levels of this index face less dissent from U.S. investors. 
At last, we control for firm-level characteristics using data from Worldscope. As used by Iliev et al. 
(2012), these are: logarithm of market capitalization – which we expect to negatively affect dissent; leverage 
(calculated as total debt to total assets) – which we believe to have a positive impact on dissent; profitability 
(calculated as nibe to total assets) – where less profitable companies should generate higher levels of dissent; 
market-to-book – being companies with higher ratios expected to face less dissent; and cross-list (a dummy 
variable which is 1 if the company is quoted in the U.S. and 0 otherwise) – with an unclear effect for the same 
reason stated in the case of insider control. Also, all models have dummy variables that account for country, 
industry, and year. 
Summary statistics for the variables considered can be found in Table 3. Strikingly, the average firm has 
almost twice the dissent levels in compensation related proposals when compared to total dissent. As for anti-
takeover and social proposals, dissent is also high, however not enough observations exist for us to make any 
sustainable conclusion. On average, 26% percent of the firms’ ownership is represented by institutions, of which 
14.5% are foreign and 24% active. Two additional facts are noteworthy: insider shareholders control 27% of the 
firms and 14% of the companies are also listed in the U.S. 
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3. Results 
We want to know how different institutional investors vote, as well as if they use their voting power as a 
governance tool. In the sections below we test for the relation between the supra mentioned forms of institutional 
ownership. 
3.1.  Dissent and Institutional Ownership 
Table 4 shows how dissent can be explained by the different allocations of institutional ownership.  We 
use dissent (total or in specific proposals) as our dependent variable and the percentage of institutional investors or 
other measures of governance as explanatory variables, resorting to a pooled OLS specification for this firm-year 
panel. Country, industry and year dummies are present in all regressions, unless stated otherwise. Also, standard 
errors are clustered at the country-industry level. 
From Panel A, where we regress total dissent on the various types of institutional ownership we conclude 
that the more foreign institutional investors there are in a firm, the higher are the levels of dissent (significant at a 
10% level). Also, the presence of passive institutional investors in a company diminishes the number of votes 
against the proposals submitted by the board (at a 5% significance level). Finally, we verify that as expected, higher 
levels of insider control and Gov41 imply less total dissent, thus corroborating our expectations. 
When focusing on the topics of compensation (Panel B) we find that, generally, the simple presence of 
institutional investors positively affects dissent. Moreover, active institutional investors tend to have a positive and 
significant impact on such proposals, something not verified in total dissent. Finally, as for total dissent, foreign 
institutional ownership is positive and significantly correlated with dissent on compensation proposals (an increase 
in 10p.p. in foreign institutional ownership has an impact of 0.662p.p. in compensation dissent).  
Panel C relates dissent on capitalization topics to institutional ownership. There is a positive and significant 
relation between foreign institutional ownership and capitalization dissent (an increase of 10p.p. in foreign 
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institutional ownership generates a 0.604p.p. increase in capitalization dissent) and a negative and significant 
relation between capitalization dissent and domestic institutional ownership (an increase of 10p.p. in the level of 
domestic institutional ownership has a negative impact of 0.709p.p. in capitalization dissent).  
In Panel D and Panel E we find no evidence of significant causality of institutional ownership on either 
routine / business or director related dissent topics. 
 Overall, confirming our expectations, we find that companies with higher levels of foreign institutional 
ownership have more dissent. It is also worth noting that, as we expect, for several topics we find that insider control 
is negative and significantly related to dissent. 
3.2.  Dissent and Institutional Ownership - Common vs Civil Law Countries 
 To further investigate the relation between institutional ownership and total, compensation, and 
capitalization dissents, we split the data in two groups (Table 5): countries with common law and countries with 
civil law legal origins.  
3.2.1. Total Dissent 
Panel A.1 reports the results for common law countries. The only significant result we obtain is that 
companies with higher passive institutional ownership have less total dissent (an increase of 10p.p. in the level of 
passive institutional investors has an impact of -1.511p.p. in total dissent).   
However, interesting outcomes are obtained upon comparison with civil law countries (Panel A.2). In 
these countries, significant results are found for the presence of institutional investors, meaning that a 10p.p. increase 
in the weight of institutional investors results in a 0.615p.p. increase in total dissent. Also, there is statistical evidence 
that this total dissent is mostly caused by foreign and active institutional investors. In accordance with our initial 
expectations, we may conclude that institutional investors take on a more active role on countries with civil law 
legal structures, which typically provide a less protective framework for minority shareholders. 
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Bearing such evidence in mind, we conclude that the frequency dissent observed for the companies with 
higher levels of institutional ownership of all types is originated in the countries with civil law legal origins.  
3.2.2. Compensation Dissent 
Seeing that compensation dissent is a topic where institutional investors have a more active role, we take a 
deeper look at how remuneration dissent is affected by the presence of different types of such investors. 
As done for total dissent, we split the voting data into two groups (common versus civil law). The results 
are presented in Panel B.1 (common law countries) and Panel B.2 (civil law countries). Whereas there are no 
significant relations between compensation dissent and different forms of institutional ownership in common law 
countries, apart from the negative relation with passive institutional investors (like there was for total dissent in these 
countries), in civil law countries this linkage is extremely strong again. 
 Compensation dissent in civil law countries is positive and significantly correlated with total, foreign and 
active institutional ownership, (a 10p.p. increase in these levels of institutional ownership will generate an increase 
of 1.521p.p., 2.094p.p., 1.712p.p., respectively in compensation dissent). 
3.2.3. Capitalization Dissent 
Finally, we look at how differently dissent is affected on topics related to capitalization issues in common 
and civil law countries (Panel C.1 and Panel C.2). 
Whereas in civil law countries a similar relation to the one found for compensation issues tends to prevail 
(with positive and significant relations for total, foreign and active institutional ownerships), in common law 
countries we obtain different conclusions. In these countries, the presence of institutional investors in general, 
domestic, active or passive institutional investors, is negatively related to dissent in topics related to capitalization. 
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This leads us to the conclusion that institutional investors are not willing to participate in capital increases 
from companies located in civil law countries, but do not oppose to do so in companies located in common law 
countries. 
When we put together the results for capitalization and compensation with the results for total dissent seen 
before we conclude that whereas there seems to be no relation between the various forms of institutional ownership 
and dissent in common law countries (apart from the negative relation for capitalization topics), there is a very 
strong positive impact of such ownerships in civil law countries.́  
3.3.  Other tests 
We try to substitute the country dummies by variables that can differentiate the countries, such as GDP 
Per Capita, Market Capitalization to GDP, and a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the country is common law or 
0 otherwise (Table 6). However, we believe that these variables do not capture completely differences between 
countries, something that may explain punctual differences in the results. 
For robustness, we also regress total, compensation and capitalization dissents using country clusters 
(instead of the previous country/industry ones). Those results are shown in Table 7. Results do not differ 
considerably for total dissent (Panel A) and, therefore, we opt for the country/industry clustering as our sample only 
includes 19 countries. However, when using country clusters to analyze compensation and capitalization dissents 
(Panel B and Panel C) we lose the significance in all variables other than foreign (compensation) and domestic 
(capitalization) institutional ownership.  
Finally, we also change to a country-year clustering (Table 8). We find a significantly positive relation 
between total, foreign or active institutional ownership and total dissent, and between foreign institutional 
ownership and compensation and capitalization dissents. We also find a negative relation between domestic 
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institutional ownership and capitalization dissent. We prefer country-industry clustering because it allows us to 
account for within each country-industry pair correlation. 
4. Conclusion 
As an original contribution, this thesis suggests that institutional investors make use of their “voice”, 
through voting, to exercise governance around the world.  
Furthermore, we find that foreign institutions are the ones which take on a more active role and, in 
accordance, vote “against” more frequently in shareholder meetings. With a bigger impact, compensation 
proposals are the ones that generate more motivation in institutions to let the managers hear their opinion. It is also 
worth mentioning how the nationality of the investors affects, in particular, the proposals related to capitalization, 
where the presence of domestic investors is linked to less dissent (meaning approval of these issues) and the 
presence of foreign investors goes in the opposite direction. 
Also, we find that investors seem prompted to vote “against” more often in countries where they know 
their interests are less protected – civil law countries – proving that they change their approach to defend themselves 
on such legal settings. 
All of this leads us to conclude that institutional investors play an important role in the exercise of 
governance, something not only in line with what was found by Aggarwal et al. (2011) or Iliev et al. (2012), but 
also adding to these studies that investors contribute to governance through voting, and that this happens for 
investors at a worldwide level, and not just for US investors. 
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Table 1 - Average dissent per country 
 
Country N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean
Australia 381 1,158 8.01 62 2.99 9 28.73 1,100 4.99 114 1.95 356 8.85 0 . 298 4.50 1,088 12.51
Austria 26 86 1.42 86 0.94 86 0.89 16 7.22 0 . 53 2.60 0 . 6 0.84 0 .
Belgium 23 80 2.27 80 1.21 79 1.61 46 7.64 0 . 47 4.06 16 5.42 6 0.06 0 .
Canada 669 1,499 5.68 1,369 3.05 1,420 4.60 582 14.95 0 . 58 10.14 163 12.83 165 3.57 2 24.48
Denmark 20 20 2.02 14 0.70 15 2.24 8 1.80 0 . 13 3.37 0 . 1 0.00 0 .
Finland 28 74 1.14 70 0.86 70 0.60 6 8.24 0 . 56 1.12 0 . 2 0.92 0 .
France 128 476 6.04 476 2.18 439 5.98 393 13.31 0 . 470 6.31 82 21.02 149 7.86 0 .
Germany 86 353 2.63 351 0.78 352 2.31 114 9.76 0 . 268 4.42 0 . 83 0.34 0 .
Greece 22 65 3.42 63 3.09 64 3.66 60 5.01 0 . 29 1.79 0 . 23 4.31 0 .
Ireland 36 95 5.41 91 2.35 88 5.87 45 8.26 0 . 91 5.22 0 . 8 12.11 0 .
Italy 109 390 2.45 384 1.14 278 2.93 180 6.41 0 . 232 3.55 0 . 13 0.56 0 .
Luxembourg 12 29 1.08 28 0.47 28 1.32 7 6.79 0 . 22 1.66 0 . 2 4.53 0 .
Netherlands 46 183 3.99 182 1.81 182 2.98 64 10.78 0 . 168 5.84 7 27.13 10 23.82 0 .
Norway 26 80 3.50 76 2.14 76 3.06 74 8.09 0 . 71 4.23 0 . 4 0.06 0 .
Portugal 25 80 2.72 80 2.11 77 2.49 61 5.49 0 . 62 1.09 0 . 6 0.03 0 .
Spain 36 129 2.43 129 1.27 125 3.53 89 4.95 0 . 123 2.53 0 . 17 0.66 0 .
Sweden 30 35 1.31 14 0.06 9 0.21 17 4.33 0 . 16 0.06 0 . 0 . 0 .
Switzerland 23 76 3.94 75 1.35 75 3.83 47 16.03 0 . 42 3.97 0 . 2 50.28 0 .
UK 280 970 2.99 944 1.93 931 2.52 940 9.12 0 . 950 2.51 0 . 75 12.22 0 .
Total 2,006 5,878 4.85 4,574 2.08 4,403 3.67 3,849 8.94 114 1.95 3,127 4.45 268 15.27 870 5.31 1,090 12.53
CAPITALIZATION ANTITAKEOVER REORGANIZATION & MERGERS SOCIAL PROPOSALSNumber 
of Firms
TOTAL ROUTINE / BUSINESS DIRECTORS COMPENSATION PREFERRED / BONDHOLDERS
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Table 2 - Average dissent per country/year 
  
N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean
Australia 2008 275 7.60 21 3.17 2 27.11 267 4.74 27 1.77 83 8.30 0 . 61 3.49 262 13.11
2009 272 9.02 15 3.38 1 52.32 263 6.03 26 1.88 102 10.31 0 . 68 4.36 256 13.58
2010 272 7.80 11 3.24 1 2.15 259 4.78 30 1.39 81 7.81 0 . 78 3.29 262 12.19
2011 271 8.06 11 1.24 5 29.98 260 4.39 22 2.38 69 9.64 0 . 72 7.07 256 11.47
2012 68 6.28 4 4.64 0 . 51 5.07 9 3.57 21 5.36 0 . 19 3.52 52 10.91
Austria 2008 20 0.98 20 1.13 20 0.64 5 1.30 0 . 17 0.96 0 . 3 1.65 0 .
2009 15 2.22 15 1.67 15 1.21 2 13.53 0 . 7 3.53 0 . 1 0.01 0 .
2010 17 1.11 17 0.52 17 0.39 3 12.66 0 . 10 3.63 0 . 2 0.03 0 .
2011 17 1.30 17 0.72 17 0.94 3 11.22 0 . 8 0.61 0 . 0 . 0 .
2012 17 1.68 17 0.71 17 1.33 3 3.45 0 . 11 5.09 0 . 0 . 0 .
Belgium 2008 15 1.53 15 1.37 14 1.72 3 3.59 0 . 10 0.35 2 2.66 0 . 0 .
2009 13 1.19 13 0.32 13 0.82 5 1.27 0 . 10 3.82 5 3.08 1 0.05 0 .
2010 17 1.97 17 1.57 17 1.84 7 4.04 0 . 9 3.23 4 4.74 3 0.06 0 .
2011 17 1.92 17 0.99 17 1.28 13 7.00 0 . 10 5.83 3 6.18 0 . 0 .
2012 18 4.29 18 1.58 18 2.21 18 11.95 0 . 8 7.75 2 14.21 2 0.05 0 .
Canada 2008 58 7.05 39 1.91 47 2.41 21 17.27 0 . 2 1.11 8 22.45 4 4.11 0 .
2009 396 2.91 388 0.88 386 2.12 116 14.03 0 . 15 4.17 39 11.76 33 4.41 2 24.48
2010 398 3.11 387 0.83 387 2.33 159 13.06 0 . 15 3.63 44 7.68 66 2.89 0 .
2011 311 3.34 304 1.23 305 3.24 119 10.76 0 . 13 1.12 43 9.24 16 4.24 0 .
2012 336 13.90 251 12.20 295 12.57 167 20.09 0 . 13 34.95 29 24.74 46 3.68 0 .
Denmark 2008 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 .
2009 1 0.00 1 0.00 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 .
2010 3 0.02 1 0.00 1 0.00 0 . 0 . 1 0.93 0 . 0 . 0 .
2011 6 3.47 5 0.15 5 1.01 4 2.80 0 . 4 9.24 0 . 1 0.00 0 .
2012 10 1.96 7 1.29 9 3.17 4 0.80 0 . 8 0.74 0 . 0 . 0 .
Finland 2008 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 .
2009 16 0.95 15 1.27 15 0.49 3 4.66 0 . 10 1.24 0 . 0 . 0 .
2010 22 2.37 21 1.12 21 1.04 1 27.95 0 . 16 1.80 0 . 1 0.00 0 .
2011 18 0.65 17 0.65 17 0.57 1 7.07 0 . 15 1.00 0 . 0 . 0 .
2012 18 0.31 17 0.40 17 0.19 1 0.44 0 . 15 0.42 0 . 1 1.84 0 .
France 2008 65 5.44 65 2.11 58 5.83 45 16.58 0 . 62 4.97 13 23.17 34 5.42 0 .
2009 98 6.66 98 2.96 88 5.81 88 13.70 0 . 98 7.07 16 22.89 49 12.33 0 .
2010 101 5.99 101 2.12 96 6.02 81 12.85 0 . 100 6.47 19 19.20 25 10.02 0 .
2011 106 5.73 106 1.79 97 5.62 94 12.00 0 . 106 6.63 19 21.69 19 1.34 0 .
2012 106 6.19 106 1.95 100 6.51 85 13.08 0 . 104 5.91 15 18.63 22 4.84 0 .
Germany 2008 72 2.20 72 0.84 72 2.14 5 2.91 0 . 67 2.99 0 . 24 0.19 0 .
2009 60 2.05 58 0.59 59 1.94 1 14.80 0 . 58 3.04 0 . 9 0.59 0 .
2010 74 3.57 74 0.68 74 2.59 57 8.58 0 . 68 6.65 0 . 18 0.66 0 .
2011 73 2.89 73 0.95 73 2.57 35 12.33 0 . 39 4.64 0 . 17 0.27 0 .
2012 74 2.32 74 0.79 74 2.26 16 10.16 0 . 36 4.86 0 . 15 0.13 0 .
Greece 2008 10 4.51 10 3.37 10 4.34 10 10.29 0 . 5 4.50 0 . 4 4.57 0 .
2009 11 1.86 10 1.96 10 1.22 9 3.44 0 . 6 0.85 0 . 3 8.54 0 .
2010 11 2.41 11 2.06 11 2.41 11 3.51 0 . 4 0.16 0 . 4 4.59 0 .
2011 17 3.64 17 3.80 17 2.89 16 4.12 0 . 10 2.19 0 . 4 4.11 0 .
2012 16 4.25 15 3.62 16 6.42 14 4.43 0 . 4 0.44 0 . 8 2.57 0 .
Ireland 2008 18 8.22 17 2.47 17 6.48 5 22.85 0 . 16 6.93 0 . 1 36.43 0 .
2009 18 4.40 18 0.91 17 5.33 6 13.04 0 . 18 4.89 0 . 1 0.10 0 .
2010 25 5.21 23 2.24 23 5.70 8 5.91 0 . 24 4.79 0 . 3 0.73 0 .
2011 19 5.45 18 3.68 18 7.12 14 6.76 0 . 19 4.97 0 . 2 28.96 0 .
2012 15 3.51 15 2.52 13 4.36 12 3.12 0 . 14 4.76 0 . 1 0.25 0 .
Italy 2008 62 2.32 62 1.04 48 4.10 18 2.97 0 . 37 0.63 0 . 0 . 0 .
2009 62 0.93 61 0.60 40 1.29 14 1.91 0 . 33 2.31 0 . 4 0.99 0 .
2010 85 1.92 82 0.91 56 2.32 29 5.92 0 . 54 2.13 0 . 3 0.07 0 .
2011 90 2.60 88 1.31 57 3.31 31 7.46 0 . 54 6.20 0 . 2 0.04 0 .
2012 91 3.92 91 1.60 77 3.23 88 7.62 0 . 54 5.09 0 . 4 0.78 0 .
Luxembourg2008 6 1.02 6 0.61 6 1.18 2 4.56 0 . 4 0.33 0 . 0 . 0 .
2009 5 0.73 5 0.31 5 0.91 1 3.00 0 . 4 1.55 0 . 0 . 0 .
2010 6 1.00 5 0.71 5 1.11 1 5.85 0 . 5 2.75 0 . 1 2.32 0 .
2011 5 1.49 5 0.53 5 2.04 1 7.79 0 . 3 2.75 0 . 1 6.73 0 .
2012 7 1.16 7 0.24 7 1.35 2 10.88 0 . 6 1.15 0 . 0 . 0 .
Netherlands 2008 34 4.45 34 2.56 34 3.43 17 11.78 0 . 31 5.83 0 . 1 0.01 0 .
2009 34 5.23 33 2.36 33 4.72 8 9.10 0 . 32 7.10 0 . 1 88.24 0 .
2010 36 3.14 36 1.91 36 1.57 20 9.37 0 . 33 5.33 1 22.68 4 14.80 0 .
2011 39 3.64 39 1.21 39 2.60 13 11.53 0 . 36 6.27 3 28.14 2 0.07 0 .
2012 40 3.66 40 1.22 40 2.83 6 13.31 0 . 36 4.80 3 27.60 2 45.33 0 .
Norway 2008 13 9.74 12 8.72 13 8.80 11 13.64 0 . 10 5.09 0 . 0 . 0 .
2009 15 2.29 15 0.37 13 1.35 14 7.37 0 . 12 4.75 0 . 0 . 0 .
2010 17 3.11 17 1.57 17 1.72 17 9.42 0 . 16 5.87 0 . 1 0.22 0 .
2011 17 1.86 16 0.66 16 2.34 15 5.79 0 . 16 3.05 0 . 2 0.00 0 .
2012 18 1.90 16 0.93 17 2.02 17 5.80 0 . 17 2.92 0 . 1 0.02 0 .
Portugal 2008 8 0.65 8 0.48 7 0.44 1 5.03 0 . 4 1.21 0 . 3 0.03 0 .
2009 13 1.30 13 0.67 12 1.43 4 2.42 0 . 8 0.64 0 . 1 0.01 0 .
2010 19 2.18 19 0.47 19 0.81 18 8.43 0 . 17 0.56 0 . 1 0.06 0 .
2011 22 4.02 22 3.33 22 4.23 22 6.16 0 . 18 2.28 0 . 1 0.00 0 .
2012 18 3.62 18 4.12 17 3.70 16 2.07 0 . 15 0.47 0 . 0 . 0 .
Spain 2008 22 1.26 22 0.60 22 1.67 12 1.24 0 . 22 1.06 0 . 2 0.11 0 .
2009 22 1.49 22 1.29 21 1.95 10 3.01 0 . 22 1.49 0 . 5 0.10 0 .
2010 31 2.77 31 1.92 29 3.42 16 2.81 0 . 31 3.29 0 . 2 0.21 0 .
2011 23 2.57 23 1.07 23 4.20 20 4.84 0 . 20 3.33 0 . 6 1.66 0 .
2012 31 3.49 31 1.22 30 5.60 31 8.20 0 . 28 3.07 0 . 2 0.04 0 .
Sweden 2008 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 .
2009 7 0.18 3 0.09 4 0.01 3 1.66 0 . 2 0.00 0 . 0 . 0 .
2010 7 4.79 3 0.01 1 0.23 5 8.94 0 . 4 0.02 0 . 0 . 0 .
2011 14 0.06 7 0.01 3 0.10 5 0.79 0 . 7 0.02 0 . 0 . 0 .
2012 7 1.49 1 0.47 1 1.34 4 5.00 0 . 3 0.22 0 . 0 . 0 .
Switzerland 2008 13 1.97 13 1.66 13 2.29 0 . 0 . 10 1.98 0 . 0 . 0 .
2009 14 3.81 14 2.21 14 4.20 5 9.04 0 . 12 3.91 0 . 0 . 0 .
2010 16 4.02 16 0.83 16 4.06 12 15.11 0 . 5 8.78 0 . 0 . 0 .
2011 17 4.49 16 0.99 16 4.27 16 17.03 0 . 8 5.82 0 . 1 0.65 0 .
2012 16 4.98 16 1.25 16 4.11 14 18.18 0 . 7 1.40 0 . 1 99.90 0 .
UK 2008 177 2.13 170 1.22 168 2.35 169 6.14 0 . 172 1.28 0 . 10 5.69 0 .
2009 182 2.85 177 1.39 170 2.29 176 9.60 0 . 178 2.25 0 . 16 13.60 0 .
2010 192 3.24 188 2.06 185 2.92 188 9.55 0 . 188 2.71 0 . 12 12.40 0 .
2011 209 3.38 205 2.36 204 2.36 205 9.37 0 . 205 2.72 0 . 18 12.49 0 .
2012 210 3.23 204 2.44 204 2.65 202 10.55 0 . 207 3.36 0 . 19 14.13 0 .
Total 2008 868 4.73 586 1.64 551 3.18 591 6.93 27 1.77 552 3.40 23 21.14 147 3.64 262 13.11
2009 1254 4.34 974 1.27 916 2.59 728 9.03 26 1.88 627 4.79 60 14.01 192 7.23 258 13.67
2010 1349 4.20 1060 1.32 1012 2.80 892 8.71 30 1.39 681 4.49 68 10.95 224 4.20 262 12.19
2011 1291 4.37 1006 1.58 956 3.32 887 8.11 22 2.38 660 4.73 68 13.42 164 5.63 256 11.47
2012 1116 6.87 948 4.57 968 6.22 751 11.69 9 3.57 607 4.71 49 22.62 143 5.80 52 10.91
PREFERRED / BONDHOLDERS CAPITALIZATION ANTITAKEOVER ORGANIZATION & MERGERS SOCIAL PROPOSALSCOMPENSATION
Country
TOTAL ROUTINE / BUSINESS DIRECTORS
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Table 3 - Summary statistics 
 
  
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Min Max Obs.
TOTAL 4.85 2.47 8.53 0.00 100.00 5,878
ROUTINE / BUSINESS 2.08 0.43 8.48 0.00 147.00 4,574
DIRECTORS 3.67 1.27 8.92 0.00 100.00 4,403
COMPENSATION 8.94 3.98 12.82 0.00 100.00 3,849
PREFERRED / BONDHOLDERS 1.95 0.61 3.53 0.00 16.97 114
CAPITALIZATION 4.45 1.63 8.35 0.00 100.00 3,127
ANTITAKEOVER 15.27 8.76 17.02 0.00 100.00 268
ORGANIZATION & MERGERS 5.31 0.84 11.82 0.00 99.90 870
SOCIAL PROPOSALS 12.53 7.80 13.18 0.11 81.51 1,090
MARKETCAP (USD) 6,749,577 1,345,368 18,000,000 255 301,000,000 10,823
LEVERAGE 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.00 0.80 10,610
MARKETBOOK 2.34 1.62 2.52 -1.59 16.32 10,436
PROFITABILITY 0.01 0.03 0.14 -0.78 0.33 10,614
CROSSLIST 0.14 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00 6,847
INSIDER 0.27 0.21 0.25 0.00 1.00 9,192
GOV41 50.92 51.22 9.79 19.51 75.61 3,641
IOTOTAL 0.26 0.23 0.20 0.00 1.00 10,574
IODOMESTIC 0.12 0.06 0.14 0.00 0.99 10,574
IOFOREIGN 0.15 0.11 0.14 0.00 0.98 10,574
IOACTIVE 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.00 1.00 10,574
IOPASSIVE 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.78 10,574
COMMONLAW 0.68 1.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 12,036
GDPPC 46,194    45,100    9,922       22,016    114,508      12,036
MARKETCAPGDP 1.00 1.04 0.38 0.15 2.81 12,036
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Table 4 - Dissent and Institutional Ownership 
Panel A: Dissent - Total 
 
 
Panel B: Dissent - Compensation 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IOTOTAL 1.685
(0.281)
IODOMESTIC -0.041
(0.986)
IOFOREIGN 2.773*
(0.061)
IOACTIVE 2.420
(0.182)
IOPASSIVE -7.707**
(0.037)
INSIDERCONTROL -1.574**
(0.017)
GOV41 -0.039*
(0.079)
MARKETCAPUSD -0.439*** -0.445*** -0.416*** -0.403*** -0.102
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.482)
LEVERAGE 0.996 0.988 1.029 1.222 1.202
(0.433) (0.432) (0.421) (0.309) (0.299)
MARKETTOBOOK 0.038 0.034 0.030 0.056 -0.037
(0.520) (0.573) (0.598) (0.416) (0.482)
PROFITABILITY -2.701 -2.571 -2.766 -2.691 -7.347**
(0.124) (0.147) (0.116) (0.154) (0.026)
CROSSLIST 0.797 0.677 0.723 0.867 0.262
(0.166) (0.288) (0.209) (0.186) (0.453)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,030 4,030 4,030 3,871 1,628
R-squared 0.131 0.132 0.132 0.134 0.213
Standard errors clustered by country-industry
Robust pvalue in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IOTOTAL 3.558*
(0.050)
IODOMESTIC -1.031
(0.739)
IOFOREIGN 6.618***
(0.005)
IOACTIVE 4.584**
(0.029)
IOPASSIVE -11.329
(0.408)
INSIDERCONTROL -1.929
(0.108)
GOV41 -0.076
(0.201)
MARKETCAPUSD -0.761*** -0.780*** -0.723*** -0.679*** -0.133
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.702)
LEVERAGE 2.223 2.196 2.270 2.302 2.039
(0.160) (0.162) (0.153) (0.145) (0.412)
MARKETTOBOOK -0.018 -0.026 -0.026 0.005 -0.206
(0.867) (0.815) (0.802) (0.965) (0.220)
PROFITABILITY -6.136*** -5.920*** -6.187*** -6.897*** -9.152*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.055)
CROSSLIST 0.577 0.239 0.530 0.847 2.386**
(0.599) (0.822) (0.632) (0.420) (0.033)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,646 2,646 2,646 2,584 1,180
R-squared 0.160 0.162 0.161 0.159 0.172
Standard errors clustered by country-industry
Robust pvalue in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Panel C: Dissent - Capitalization 
 
Panel D: Dissent - Routine / Business 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IOTOTAL 1.872
(0.342)
IODOMESTIC -7.090**
(0.025)
IOFOREIGN 6.039***
(0.006)
IOACTIVE 2.065
(0.343)
IOPASSIVE -1.194
(0.864)
INSIDERCONTROL -2.790**
(0.022)
GOV41 -0.032
(0.481)
MARKETCAPUSD -0.304 -0.441** -0.294 -0.281 -0.250
(0.144) (0.040) (0.173) (0.206) (0.307)
LEVERAGE 2.003 1.874 2.037 1.642 1.321
(0.162) (0.187) (0.158) (0.263) (0.521)
MARKETTOBOOK -0.080 -0.091 -0.081 -0.056 -0.108
(0.270) (0.225) (0.257) (0.483) (0.296)
PROFITABILITY -1.016 -0.679 -1.044 -0.747 -0.471
(0.555) (0.709) (0.543) (0.706) (0.900)
CROSSLIST 1.525** 1.161 1.524** 1.273* 1.035*
(0.030) (0.101) (0.032) (0.085) (0.085)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,043 2,043 2,043 1,996 1,114
R-squared 0.124 0.132 0.124 0.135 0.160
Standard errors clustered by country-industry
Robust pvalue in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IOTOTAL 0.091
(0.943)
IODOMESTIC 1.049
(0.700)
IOFOREIGN -0.664
(0.464)
IOACTIVE 0.369
(0.796)
IOPASSIVE -3.306
(0.357)
INSIDERCONTROL -1.287*
(0.051)
GOV41 -0.014
(0.518)
MARKETCAPUSD 0.077 0.081 0.087 0.061 0.222
(0.442) (0.432) (0.406) (0.595) (0.108)
LEVERAGE -0.337 -0.358 -0.334 0.168 0.811
(0.756) (0.741) (0.760) (0.876) (0.253)
MARKETTOBOOK 0.037 0.042 0.033 0.036 -0.073
(0.594) (0.579) (0.625) (0.614) (0.149)
PROFITABILITY -1.800 -1.939 -1.844 -1.505 -1.616
(0.522) (0.502) (0.510) (0.587) (0.359)
CROSSLIST -0.178 -0.093 -0.208 -0.247 0.269
(0.693) (0.822) (0.654) (0.541) (0.481)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,181 3,181 3,181 3,041 1,370
R-squared 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.070 0.110
Standard errors clustered by country-industry
Robust pvalue in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Panel E: Dissent - Directors 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IOTOTAL -0.578
(0.640)
IODOMESTIC -2.100
(0.389)
IOFOREIGN 0.382
(0.801)
IOACTIVE -0.310
(0.813)
IOPASSIVE -4.134
(0.354)
INSIDERCONTROL -0.450
(0.607)
GOV41 -0.044
(0.113)
MARKETCAPUSD -0.127 -0.129 -0.117 -0.105 0.139
(0.276) (0.267) (0.311) (0.410) (0.386)
LEVERAGE 1.068 1.088 1.076 1.495 0.948
(0.372) (0.351) (0.369) (0.196) (0.462)
MARKETTOBOOK -0.011 -0.018 -0.015 -0.006 -0.087
(0.890) (0.831) (0.850) (0.937) (0.226)
PROFITABILITY -0.360 -0.146 -0.396 -0.182 -0.706
(0.899) (0.960) (0.889) (0.950) (0.756)
CROSSLIST 0.498 0.395 0.471 0.312 -0.394
(0.339) (0.512) (0.363) (0.579) (0.233)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,089 3,089 3,089 2,946 1,289
R-squared 0.099 0.100 0.099 0.103 0.153
Standard errors clustered by country-industry
Robust pvalue in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5 - Dissent and Institutional Ownership - 
Common vs Civil Law Countries 
Panel A.1: Dissent Total - Common Law Countries 
 
Panel B.1: Dissent Compensation - Common Law 
Countries 
 
Panel A.2: Dissent Total - Civil Law Countries 
 
Panel B.2: Dissent Compensation - Civil Law 
Countries 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3)
IOTOTAL 0.535
(0.805)
IODOMESTIC -0.339
(0.899)
IOFOREIGN 1.170
(0.610)
IOACTIVE 1.413
(0.558)
IOPASSIVE -15.108***
(0.001)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,492 2,492 2,492
R-squared 0.133 0.133 0.134
Standard errors clustered by country-industry
Robust pvalue in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Control variable coefficients not shown
(1) (2) (3)
IOTOTAL 0.310
(0.891)
IODOMESTIC -2.505
(0.461)
IOFOREIGN 2.633
(0.307)
IOACTIVE 1.805
(0.504)
IOPASSIVE -31.036**
(0.027)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,732 1,732 1,732
R-squared 0.187 0.188 0.190
Standard errors clustered by country-industry
Robust pvalue in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Control variable coefficients not shown
(1) (2) (3)
IOTOTAL 6.146***
(0.000)
IODOMESTIC 4.134
(0.202)
IOFOREIGN 6.786***
(0.000)
IOACTIVE 7.128***
(0.000)
IOPASSIVE -0.119
(0.978)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,538 1,538 1,538
R-squared 0.219 0.219 0.220
Standard errors clustered by country-industry
Robust pvalue in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Control variable coefficients not shown
(1) (2) (3)
IOTOTAL 15.209***
(0.004)
IODOMESTIC -3.165
(0.855)
IOFOREIGN 20.937***
(0.000)
IOACTIVE 17.121***
(0.007)
IOPASSIVE 2.452
(0.911)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 914 914 914
R-squared 0.186 0.189 0.186
Standard errors clustered by country-industry
Robust pvalue in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Control variable coefficients not shown
22 
 
 
Panel C.1: Dissent Capitalization - Common Law 
Countries 
 
Panel A.2: Dissent Capitalization - Civil Law 
Countries 
  
(1) (2) (3)
IOTOTAL -7.348**
(0.022)
IODOMESTIC -13.008***
(0.004)
IOFOREIGN -3.222
(0.297)
IOACTIVE -6.475**
(0.037)
IOPASSIVE -24.211**
(0.021)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 852 852 852
R-squared 0.145 0.150 0.147
Standard errors clustered by country-industry
Robust pvalue in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Control variable coefficients not shown
(1) (2) (3)
IOTOTAL 8.523***
(0.000)
IODOMESTIC 3.604
(0.484)
IOFOREIGN 9.883***
(0.001)
IOACTIVE 9.867***
(0.000)
IOPASSIVE -1.609
(0.892)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,191 1,191 1,191
R-squared 0.198 0.199 0.199
Standard errors clustered by country-industry
Robust pvalue in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Control variable coefficients not shown
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Table 6 - Dissent and Institutional Ownership - 
Country Control Variables  
Panel A: Dissent Total 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Dissent Compensation 
 
 
Panel C: Dissent Capitalization 
 
  
(1) (2) (3)
IOTOTAL -2.353*
(0.063)
IODOMESTIC -5.525***
(0.002)
IOFOREIGN 0.832
(0.540)
IOACTIVE -1.456
(0.334)
IOPASSIVE -12.716***
(0.001)
COMMONLAW 0.037 0.350 -0.127
(0.932) (0.438) (0.779)
GDPPC -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.804) (0.506) (0.968)
MARKETCAPGDP 2.002*** 2.202*** 2.024***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Country Dummies No No No
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,030 4,030 4,030
R-squared 0.089 0.093 0.090
Standard errors clustered by country-industry
Robust pvalue in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Control variable coefficients not shown
(1) (2) (3)
IOTOTAL 12.192***
(0.000)
IODOMESTIC 11.620***
(0.000)
IOFOREIGN 12.819***
(0.000)
IOACTIVE 13.973***
(0.000)
IOPASSIVE -12.525
(0.232)
COMMONLAW -6.106*** -6.060*** -6.456***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDPPC -0.000* -0.000** -0.000
(0.053) (0.049) (0.138)
MARKETCAPGDP 5.719*** 5.754*** 5.764***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Country Dummies No No No
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,646 2,646 2,646
R-squared 0.124 0.124 0.126
Standard errors clustered by country-industry
Robust pvalue in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Control variable coefficients not shown
(1) (2) (3)
IOTOTAL -1.512
(0.361)
IODOMESTIC -10.983***
(0.000)
IOFOREIGN 5.071***
(0.009)
IOACTIVE -0.074
(0.968)
IOPASSIVE -14.604***
(0.007)
COMMONLAW -1.578** -1.086* -1.738***
(0.012) (0.093) (0.006)
GDPPC -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.902) (0.346) (0.859)
MARKETCAPGDP 0.969* 1.607*** 0.944
(0.094) (0.008) (0.105)
Country Dummies No No No
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,043 2,043 2,043
R-squared 0.065 0.082 0.068
Standard errors clustered by country-industry
Robust pvalue in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Control variable coefficients not shown
24 
 
Table 7 - Dissent and Institutional Ownership - 
Cluster by Country 
Panel A: Dissent Total 
 
 
Panel B: Dissent Remuneration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Dissent Capitalization 
 
  
(1) (2) (3)
IOTOTAL 1.685
(0.124)
IODOMESTIC -0.041
(0.975)
IOFOREIGN 2.773**
(0.025)
IOACTIVE 2.420**
(0.034)
IOPASSIVE -7.707*
(0.080)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,030 4,030 4,030
R-squared 0.131 0.132 0.132
Standard errors clustered by country
Robust pvalue in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Control variable coefficients not shown
(1) (2) (3)
IOTOTAL 3.558
(0.198)
IODOMESTIC -1.031
(0.872)
IOFOREIGN 6.618**
(0.014)
IOACTIVE 4.584
(0.164)
IOPASSIVE -11.329
(0.434)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,646 2,646 2,646
R-squared 0.160 0.162 0.161
Standard errors clustered by country
Robust pvalue in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Control variable coefficients not shown
(1) (2) (3)
IOTOTAL 1.872
(0.593)
IODOMESTIC -7.090**
(0.010)
IOFOREIGN 6.039
(0.113)
IOACTIVE 2.065
(0.580)
IOPASSIVE -1.194
(0.868)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,043 2,043 2,043
R-squared 0.124 0.132 0.124
Standard errors clustered by country
Robust pvalue in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Control variable coefficients not shown
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Table 8 - Dissent and Institutional Ownership - 
Cluster by Country-Year 
Panel A: Dissent Total 
 
 
Panel B: Dissent Compensation 
 
 
Panel C: Dissent Capitalization 
 
(1) (2) (3)
IOTOTAL 1.685**
(0.019)
IODOMESTIC -0.041
(0.982)
IOFOREIGN 2.773**
(0.026)
IOACTIVE 2.420***
(0.007)
IOPASSIVE -7.707
(0.170)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,030 4,030 4,030
R-squared 0.131 0.132 0.132
Standard errors clustered by country-year
Robust pvalue in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Control variable coefficients not shown
(1) (2) (3)
IOTOTAL 3.558
(0.218)
IODOMESTIC -1.031
(0.818)
IOFOREIGN 6.618**
(0.019)
IOACTIVE 4.584
(0.118)
IOPASSIVE -11.329
(0.348)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,646 2,646 2,646
R-squared 0.160 0.162 0.161
Standard errors clustered by country-year
Robust pvalue in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Control variable coefficients not shown
(1) (2) (3)
IOTOTAL 1.872
(0.431)
IODOMESTIC -7.090***
(0.005)
IOFOREIGN 6.039**
(0.021)
IOACTIVE 2.065
(0.410)
IOPASSIVE -1.194
(0.851)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,043 2,043 2,043
R-squared 0.124 0.132 0.124
Standard errors clustered by country-year
Robust pvalue in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Control variable coefficients not shown
